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2Preface.
In preparing the present thesis, the writer has divided
the material into four chapter, the first one discussing the
causes end the results of the Chino-Japanese war, the second, the
usurpation in South Manchuria, the third taking up the subject
oi the Japanese in Shangtun Province, and the last setting forth
the the truth concerning 21 demands. All the matter in support
of the arguments of these chapters has been taken from official
documents and authorities, American, Japanese, and Chinese.
Since very few or rather, almost none of the Chinese Books bear-
ing on the present subject have been rendered into English, the
writer has been obliged to translate some of the material for
his use, and takes the whole responsibility for the versions
presented.
H. L. Chang.

3.
Chapter I.
The Chino-Japanese War.
The Cfcino-Japanese War in 1894 was one of the most signi-
ficant occurrences in the modern history of the Fax East, marking
the beginning of the decline of China on one hand, and the rise
of Japan on the other.
The fundamental cause of the war can be said, in a word
to have been due to the rivalry between the two nations for the
supremacy over Corea. In order to treat the cause of this great
war in the Far East more accurately, it is necessary to go back
to the history of the relations of Corea with these two powerful
neighbors.
Corea is a mountainous peninsula between the Yellow Sea
and the Sea of Japan, with an area of about 84,000 square miles,
and with a population of 10,500,000. It was for many years a
dependency of China.
1
In 1128 B.C. the Chinese Emperor, Chow-wu-
wang, created Kiga as the King of North Corea. The Kiga's Dynasty
lasted nearly a thousand years. During the Tang Dynasty of China
(A. D. 318-907) the whole northern part of Corea was directly
administered by the Chinese Government. About the hundred years
after this time, Japan received an impetus in direction of Rudd-
hism from Corea, but "there is not a shred of proof to uphold the
claim that Corea, was a tributary to that power," as the Japanese
claimed. In 1265, the Corean soldiers with the Mongol conquerors
invaxied Japan twice; but they were defeated. In A. D. 1591,
1. liitchell's Geography, p. 89.
2. Hulbert: The Passing of Corea. p. 79.

Hideyoshi, a powerful Japanese shogun, invaded Corea, and captured
Seoul, but after his death his forces were driven out toy Corean
soldiers with the aid of the Chinese troops.**
When the Manchus established a New Dynasty in China, the
second Emperor made treaty with Corea. The oath was te.ken by him
as follows: "from this day we have but one mind and one thought..
If Corea breaks the treaty, may Heaven send a curse upon her; if
the Manchus breaks it, may they likewise be punished. The two
kings have an equal regard for truth, and they will govern accord-
ing to the principle of religion. May Heaven help us and give
us blessing. " The oath of Corea was, "This day Korea takes oath
and forms a treaty with Kin Kingdom. We swear by this sacrafice
that each shall dwell secure in the possession of his own lands;
if either hates and injures the other, may Heaven send punish-
ment upon the offending party. These two kings have minds regard-
4
ful of truth. Each must be at peace with the other. " But these
oaths were worth nothing. The Japanese sent secret envoys to
urge Corea against the Manchus, that she could help her (Corea)
if Corea would break the oath. When it became plain that Corea
was false, the Manchus invaded Corea immediately, and made the
king go through a humiliating ceremony of surrender. Since this
time, Corea has become a real tributary state of China continuing
so until 1895. 5
In 187 5 a Japanese war vessel landed a surveying party
on Kangwa Island, and was attacked by the Coreans. A cry for war
in Japan was very high and a special envoy Sun Yu Lin was sent
to ask the Chinese government about this case. Prince Guchin, the
Chinese foreign minister, assumed "so far as Corea was the tribu-
4. Hubbert: The Passing of Corea. pp. 104.
5. LiJiL-en: The Recent Diplomatic History of China, pp. 174.
t
5.
tary state of China, Japanese can not take any action upon her with-
out negotiating with China. But unfortunately the Japanese
ignored this claim, and settled the controversy directly with Corea
in accordance with the well-known Kangwa Treaty. The first article
of the treaty was, "Corea is an independent sts.te and Japan treats
her as equal." The fourth and the fifth articles contained, "the
Japanese settlement at the Port of Fusan and provided to open two
more new ports within the stated period. " It was very obvious
according to the first article that Japan tried to ignore the
Chinese surzerainty over Corea, and pave her way of aggresive policy
towards Corea. On China's side, she should protest absolutely
against the treaty or even go to war with Japan unless the treaty
7
were abolished. But on account of her ignorance of the inter-
national law, she did not say anything about this. This was the
first chance for Japan to take steps in Corea, the first great
mistake of China toward losing Corea, and the first thread leading
to the Chinese-Japanese War.
Unfortunately, the events of 1880 caused a complete de-
struction of all the hopes for the progress of Corea. Some radical
leaders, Kim-Hong-Jip, Kim Ok-Kyun, Pak Yang-Hyo, Su Chap-pil with
some experienced Japanese, wanted to have the radical changes in
government, but the Min party, the Queen's family, insisted on
having a slow and moderate reform because they knew "Corea is not
ready to inaugurate the sweeping changes" as the radicals imagined.
The two great rival factions were responsible for the crisis in the
relations between China and Japan, and were the crucial points in
6. Liu Yen: The recent Diplomatic History of China, p. 177.
7. Liu Yen: The recent Diplomatic History of China, p. 177.

the controversy of the two nations.
The Military Riot of 1883 was caused by the wretched
treatment of troops. The Min family was the main point of attack.
Several of them were killed and the others fled. At the same time
the Japanese were attacked, and the legation burned, the Min family
appealed to China to put down the riot, and China sent three thous-
and 30 Idlers under the command of the well-known officer, Yuan
Shih-Xei, who was to play an important role in Corea. As a result
peace was restored and by the payment of indemnity by Corea, the
friendship with Japan was resumed. The Chinese now had firm hand
on the government and exercised the real sovereign power over
Corea.
In 1884, the radical leaders tried to work out their
radical plan of changing Corea, but their strength and influence
were not enough to combat with conservatives, who had Chinese
forces behind them. The leaders of that party, communicated with
Japan, or at least an understanding was arrived at, that Japan
should back them in their attempt to stem the current of conserva-
tism. After arranging for a Japanese man-of-war to come to their
support, the imminent danger in which this placed the radical
faction caused them to act at once. 1^ A big banquet took place on
December 4th, for celebrating the opening of the new post office.
Min Yong-ik was one of the principal guests, but members of both
factions were together with some foreign representatives, the
Chinese generals, and the foreign advisers. In the midst of the
dinner Min Yong-il was assassinated in the court. The radical
leaders hurried to the palace where they secured possession of the
King's person, and forced him to order all the ministers of depart-
8. Hulbert: The Passing of Corea. pp. 121-133.
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merits to be "brought before him. When they oame, they were cut
down one by one in cold blood by a company of students just from
Japan, who had come to the palace as bodyguard to the radical
leaders, three of whom, Kim, Hong, and Pak, hastened to the palace,
and persuaded the King to go elsewhere, writing at the same time
to the Japanese minister, to come to the palace. The four hundred
Japanese occupied the palace. They and the conspirators were
installing themselves in their posts. The commander of the Chinese
garrison seemed to have been, for the moment, hesitating how to
act. Having been advised by some foreign representatives, he
appeared to make a military attack upon the palace. The Japanese
were defeated and withdrew to their legation, and the Japanese
minister to leave Seoul. The entrance of the Chinese troops
terminated the conspiracy, most of whom were killed, but Kim
escaped to Japan. The war between the two countries seemed immi-
nent, but was averted by negotiation between li Hung Chang and
Count Ito, who agreed upon a famous Tienstsin Convention. It
provided "the forces which had been sent by China to restore the
order, and by Japan to re-establish her legation were to be with-
drawn, the King of Corea was to be invited to organize a sufficient
armed force of his own to maintain order in future. In case of
any disturbance of a serious character oocuring in Korea, render-
ing it necessary for the respective countries (China and Japan)
either of them to send troops to Corea, it is hereby understood
they shall give, each to the other, previous notice in writing of
«12
their intention."
9. Liu Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China, p. 185.
10. Hulbert: The Passing of Corea. p. 124.
11. Fortnightly Review. Vol. 63, pp. 618-bSb.
12 Curzon: Problem of the Far East. p. las.

This was the first great reverse that Japan secured in
the Chinese hands, this was the first time that Japan seoured the
equal footing in Corea, and this was another thread leading to the
war. But really Core?- henceforth was completely in China's hands
and was destined to remain there until Japan reversed the verdict
13in 1894, just ten years later.
These ten ye3.rs may be passed without much comment. We
still remember that Mr. Kim, one of conspirators in 1884, after
living ten years as a political refugee on the Japanese soil, was
persuaded by a Corean who had deliberately acquired his confidence,
to run over for a trip to Shanghai, where he was promptly murdered.
The murderer was arrested by the Chinese authorities and sent
together with the body to Corea. The Japanese blamed the Chinese
government for not punishing the murderer stringently. The irri-
tation caused by the occurrence in Japan was so great that it has
been alleged as a cause contributary to the war.
"The time was ripe, however, in other respects and it
seems to be now generally admitted that Japan had been preparing
a long time for a trisJL of strength with her imperial neighbor and
a
that was on ly_/quest ion of occasion when the outbreak might occur.
Everytning tends to show that she had predetermined to strike for
the preponderance in the Far East, and the various motives have
been surmised as contributing to her immediate decision. Among
others, the exigeiicies of the Japanese government itself. The
overthrow of the tycoons, who represented the northern influence,
is well known to have been accomplished by a combination of the
southern clons.
1 3. Hulbert: The Passing of Corea. p. 126

Two of these, Sat3suma and Chosin hs.ve since been able to keep the
reins of government practically in their hands, though it may not
be conceived without encountering jealousy and opposition. The
popular demand for ministerial responsibility is said to inspire
in some degree by this feeling. Dissolution after the dissolution
has, at any rate, resulted in the return of a hostile majority
to the Diet; and one object of this Corean enterprise is freely
alleged to have been to divert population from domestic quarrels. "
A still more important motive of the Japanese Govern-
ment itself in bringing on the war was in connection with its
foreign policy. The original treaties contained two essential
stipulations:- the one fixed a uniform customs tariff of five per
cent, and the other subjected foreign residents to the jurisdiction
of their own consulor authorities. "The Japanese patriots began
denouncing the treaties and agitating for the recovering of tariff
13
and judicial autonomy. " The government had two difficulties in
solving the problem. The one was "European residents in estimating
the situation protested to their respective governments that the
change would be premature until the new codes were actually in
force and their work had been tested by experience, while a strong
party in Japan objected to any project of guarantees as inconsis-
tent with the national dignity and objected even to the proposed
equivalent as inconsistent with the national interests. Having
gorged and being prepared to over rule the opposition at home, the
Japanese statesmen, on the verge of success abroad, are said to
have perceived another awkward dilemma. The new treaty is not to
15. Fortnightly Review: Vol. 63, 1894 p. 623 by Mr .R. S. Gundry.
ti ii ti ti ii n it it n ii it n it

10.
come to operation until similar agreements have been reached with
other powers. If China therefore restrained her present treaty
and her extra-territorial rights, other nations would object to
surrendering theirs or to paying higher duties than the Chinese;
while if China were included in the general revision, Chinese
millions might overflow across the strait and become a social em-
barrassment. From either point of view, China presented a diffi-
culty. The success of war might enable Japan to dictate convenient
17
arrangements for the future.
"
The last and direct cause of the war was the insurrectioi
18
of the Tang Hak, or the Eastern Doctrine in Corea. This party
rose in revolt primarily against the Roman Catholic converts and
finally against the government likewise. Thirty thousand men were
soon in the army, and so successful were they that they defeated
the royal troops. After capturing the important city of Chung-chong,
they prepared to march to the capital, Seoul. In this serious con-
dition, the King of Corea appealed to China for troops to help him
in putting down the rebellion. In reply to the appeal, fifteen
thousand soldiers were sent by China to the district on the west
19
coast of Corea, a hundred miles from Chemulpo.
With their arrival the insurrention collapsed. The
Chinese troops returned to their country, with the exception of
five hundred men who remained to act as a guard to the king in case
of any further disturbance. According to the treaty of May, A. D.
1885, "the Chinese government indeed notified the Japanese govern-
17. Fortnightly Review. Vol. 62 1894. p. 624.
18. Douglas: The Story of Nations, p. 433.
19. Macgowan: A History of China, p. 594.

11.
ment on the fourth of June of its purpose, but the latter power
declares that the communication was not made as promptly as it
might have been, and that therefore the spirit of treaty had not
been observed by China. " Japan dispatched five thousand men under
the command of Oshiraa, fifteen hundred of them marched directly
to the capital of Corea, while the rest encamped at Chemulpo. "That
this force meant war was evident from the fact that two hundred and
fifty horses accompanied it, a considerable cannon and all the
necessary equipment for a three months campaign. TShen the Japanese
were asked the meaning of this large force, they declared that it
was simply for the protection of their people, an sjiswer that no
one believed, for any danger that might have threatened them had
30passed away with the collapse of the rebellion. " After the
Japanese troops reached Seoul, Japan asked China to cooperate with
her to make certain radical reforms for the Kingdom of Core? But
China declined to join in imposing on the plea that "it was against
21
her habits to interfere in tributary internal affairs. " On the
eighteenth of July of 1894, the Corean government requested the
withdrawal of the Japanese troops; on the twentieth, Japan sent an
ultimatum to the Corean government, to which, on the twenty-second,
the Corean government gave an unsatisfactory answer. The Japanese
trccrc s attacked the King's palace and became the master of the
labyrinth and consequently the government,. From that time until
the later flight of the King to the Russian legation, Corea was
23
practically under the Japanese control. " After the capture
30. Macgowan: A History of China, p. 595.
21. Liu Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China, p. 198.
32. Japan and China at War: The Nation, Vol 33,1896. pp. 476-477.

of the King's Palace, the regular hostilities between Japan and
Corea ended, and the war between China and Japan followed.
On the twenty-fifth of July, an English steamer, by
the name of Kow-shing, had been chartered by Li Hung Chang to
convey eleven hundred troops to Corea, and when she was nearing her
destination, she was met by the Japanese man-of-war, Nanivea, and
torpedoed her, only two hundred of the troops on board being
eventaully saved.
The first great battle was fought at Pinyong on the
fifteenth of September. The Chinese troops were defeated, six
thousand men with a large quantity of arms and a great supply of
provisions were lost. Two days after this, a naval battle was
33fought off at the mouth of the Yalu River. The Chinese fleet
consisted of eleven men-of-war and six torpedo boats. The battle
began at ten o'clock in the morning and lasted about six hours.
Although the Chinese forces showed considerable pluck in allowing
themselves to be blocked about for so long a time, the Japanese,
wfto had the faster ships and the better guns, displayed more
scientific military art and good generalship than the Chinese. The
result was that four Chinese ships were sunk and the others were
destroyed by fire. The Japanese ships also suffered by fire,
but they subsequently repaired them and were capable of joining
24
their squadrons after a time.
The result of these two engagements gave the Japanese
courage to invade Manchuria. The troops hastened from Pinyong to
the Yalu, the boundary line between Corea and Llanchuria. Crossing
33. Macgowan: A History of China, p. 597.
34. " " n n p , 597.
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that river without any serious obstacle, they took possession
(October 35) of Chin-lien-chen. On the twenty-first of November,
the Japanese troops appeared before the famous port Arthur. About
two o'clock in the afternoon, with the loss of only about four
hundred men, the great fortress was captured. Many innocent in-
35
habitants were massacred by the Japanese army.
In the advance in Manchuria, Japan continued with equal
success. It became plain that the Chinese government should better
make peace, sending Mr. Detring to Japan on November 37th, to see
if the Japanese authorities were willing to come to terms or not.
As he was a foreigner of no special distinction, and with no full
power to make a treaty, he was not received, and he returned to
36
China without accomplishing anything. On January 36th, the other
two envoys, Chang Ju-Huan, and Shan Yu-lein, started for Japan
to open peace negotiations, but their credentials had been found
defective, and the war was still going on. Before the second
envoys could be sent, the capture of Hai-chang and Kai-Pine made the
Japanese forces masters of the Liao-tung peninsula. The last and th<
final battle at Wei-hai-wei was fougth in February. On land and
sea the Japanese forces were completely victorious. Admiral Ting
for several days offered a most heroic defence, but after the
failure to secure an important position, he commit ed suicide in his
3?
cabin and the flag of surrender was hoisted.
The Chinese government was clearly in danger at this
time. Li Hung Chang was consequently dispatched (March 15) to Japan
for peace negotiations. He was show and badly wounded by a Japanese,
35. Macgowan: A History of China, pp. 599
36. Liu Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China, p. 318.
37. Liu Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of Cnina. p. 330.

The Japanese authorities were so distrustful. After this untoward
circumstance, Japan granted an armistice for twenty days, which
was subsequently to extend to May 8, excluding Formosa which the
Japanese intended to conquer and occupy permanently. The ne-
gotiations were conducted by Li Hung Chang, the Planipoteniary
of China, and Ito the Plenipotentiary of Japan. The treaty in-
cluding eleven articles and three separate articles was made at
Shimonoseki between Japan and China, and ratifications were
exchanged at Chefoo on the 8th of May. The main features and the
28
important articles are the following:
Article I.
China recognizes definitely the full and complete
independence and autonomy of Corea, and in consequence the payment
of tribute and the performance of Ceremonies and formalities by
Corea to China, in derogation of such independence and autonomy,
shall wholly cease for the future.
Article II.
China ceded to Japah in perpetuity and full sovereign-
ty, the following territories, together with all fortifications
thereon: •
(a) The southern portion of the province of Feng
Tien with the following boundaries:
The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the
River Yalu and ascends that stream to the mouth of the River An-
ping, from thence runs to Fen Huang, from thence to Maicheng, from
thence to Ying Kow, forming a line which describes the southern
portion of the territory. The places above named are included in
28. See Foreign Relation of the United States, 1895, r>axt I, pp
&^-fg; I^V^?.-^ 1 Treaties between China and Foreign' countries
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the ceded territory. When the line reaches the River Liao at Teng
Kow, it follows the course of that stream to its mouth, where it
terminates. The mid-channel of the River Liao shall be taken as
the demarcation.
This cession also includes all islands appertaining or
belonging to the province of Fen Tien, situated in the eastern
portion of the Bay of Liao Tung and in the northeastern part of the
Yellow Sea.
(b) The island of Formosa, together with all the
islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Formosa.
(c) The Pescadores Group - that is to say, all islands
lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of
Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.
Article IV.
China agrees to pay as war indemnity the sum of
200,000,000 Kuping taels. The said sum is to be paid in eight in-
stallments, the first installment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid
within six months and the second installment cf 50,000,000 taels
to be paid within twelve months after the exchange of the ratifi-
cations of this act; the remaining sum to be paid in six equal
annual installments, as follows:
The first of such equal annual installments to be paid
within two years, the second, within three years, the third, within
four years, the fourth, within five years, the fifth, within six
years, the sixth, within seven years, after the exchange of the
ratifications of this act. Interest at the rate of 5 per centum
per annum shall begin to run on all unpaid portions of the ss,id
indemnity from the date the first installment falls due.
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China shall, however, have the right to pay by antici-
pation at any time any or all of said installments. In case the whole
amount of the said indemnity is paid within three years after the
exchange of the ratifications of the present act, all interest shall
be waived, and the interest for two years and a half or any less
period, if then already paid, shall be included as a part of the
principle amount of the indemnity.
Article VI.
All treaties between China and Japan having come to an
end, in consequence of war, China engages immediately upon the ex-
change of rati ficiations of this act, to appoint plenipotentiaries
to conclude with the Japanese plenipotentiaries to a treaty of
commerce and navigation and a convention to regulate frontier inter-
course and trade.
The treaties, conventions, and regulations, now sub-
sisting between China and European powers shall serve as basis for
said treaty and convention between China and Japan. From the date
of the exchange of the ratifications of this act until the said
treaty 3nd convention are brought into actual operation, the
Japanese Government, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier
intercourse and trs.de, industries, ships, and subjects, shall, in
every respect, be accorded by China, most- favored-nation treatment.
China makes, in addition, the following concessions,
to take effect six months after the date of the present act:
First. The following cities, towns and ports, in
addition to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade,
residence, industries, and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under
the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as
exist at the present in open cities, towns, and ports of China.
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(1) Shashih, in the province of Hupeh.
(2) Chungking, in the province in Szechuan.
(3) Suchow, in the province of Kian Su.
(4) Hang Chow, in the province ofChekieng.
The Japanese government shall have the right to station
consuls at any or all of the above named places.
Second. Steam navigation for vessels under the Japan-
ese flag for the conveyance of passengers and caxgo shall be ex-
tended to the following places.
(1) On the upper Yangtze River, from Ichang to
Chungking.
(3) On the Woo sung River and the canal, from Shanghai
to Suchow and Hang Chow.
Third. Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce
in the interior of China or transporting imported merchandise into
the interior of China shall have the right temporarily to rent or
hire warehouses for the storage of the articles so purchased or
transported without the payment of any ta.xes or exactions whatever.
Fourth. Japanese subjects shall be free to engage
in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities,
towns, and the ports of China, and shall be at liberty to import
into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated
duties thereon.
All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China
shall, in respect of inland transiu and internal taxes , duties,
charges, and exactions of all kinds, and also in respect of ware-
housing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon
the same footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as
merchandise imported by Japanese subjects into China.

IS.
In view of the first article, it puts an end to the
contentions and struggles between China and Japan over Corea once
and for all. China's protection over that country is at an end,
and Japan now has free hand to use her best energy in forcing on the
Corean government the domestic reforms. Japan at once sent one of
her greatest statesmen, County Inouye, to make this. She also sent
some of the worst elements of her population, a hord of adventurous
immigrants who immediately began to exploit the Corean, spoiling the
name of Japanese. Let me quote Count Inouye' s own words to bear
witness as one of the chief reasons why Corea did not like the
professedly benevolent efforts of Japan, and why Japan made the
Corean conditions worse during the next ten years:
"All the Japanese are overbearing and rude in their
dealings with the Coreans. The readiness of the Chinese to bow
their heads may be natural instinct, but this trs.it in their
character is their strength as merchants. The Japanese are not
only overbearing but violent in their attitude toward the Coreans.
When there is the slightest misunderstanding, they do not hesitate
to employ their fists. Indeed, it is not uncommon for them to
pitch Coreans into the river, or to cut them down with swords. If
the merchants commit these acts of violence, the conduct of those
who are not merchants may well be imagined. They say: We have
made you an independent nation, we have saved you from the Tonghaks,
whoever dares to reject our advice or oppose our actions is an
ungrateful traitor. Even military coolies use language like that
toward the Coreans. Under such circumstances, it would be a wonder
if the Corean developed much friendship with the Japanese. It is
natural that they should entertain more amicable feelings toward
other nations than toward. Japan. For this state of things, the
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•
Japanese themselves are responsible. Now that the Chinese are re-
turning to Corea, unless the Japanese correct themselves and behave
with more moderation, that will entirely forfeit the respect and love
of Coreans.
Another circumstance I regret very much for the sake of
the Japanese residents is, that some of them have been unscrupulous
them
enough to cheat the Corean government and people by supplyin_/with
spurious articles. The Corean taught by such experience, naturally
hesitates to buy from the Japanese. An examination of recent pur-
chases made by the Corean government from the Japanese merchants woud
cause conscientious men to cry out. I do not say the Japanese alone
have been untrustworth. But I ho
. e, that in the future, they will
endeavor to get credit for honesty instead of aiming at immediate
29
speculative gains."
"The Japanese had the misfortune also to be officially
and inextricably implicated in an attack on the palace on the morning
of October 8, in the course of which the Coree.n queen was brutally
murdered. Japan's opportunity was for the moment, by the acts of
her own subjects, worse than lost. " T£e King fled to the Russian
legation for safety, and from there for two years under Russian in-
30
fluence, directed the affa,irs of his realm. In 1898 a Russian and
Japanese agreement recognized definitely "the sovereignty and the
entire independence of Corea. " In Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 190S
"the high contracting parties, having mutually recognized the inde-
pendence of China and Corea" declared themselves to be "entirely
31
uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in other countries.
"
29. County Inouye, in the Nichi Nichi Shimbun, quoted by Professor
Longford, in The Story of Corea, pp. 337-338.
30. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East, pp.206.
31. Liu Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China, p. 356.
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Three years later in renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the
protection of Corea integrity was forgotten, on the other hand,
Great Britain recognized the right of Japan "to take such measures
of guidance, control, and protection in Cores as she may deem
proper and necessary to safeguard her interests provided always that
such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal Opportuni-
sts
ties for the commerce end industry of all nations. " In the
Portsmouth Treaty, Russia also admitted the Japanese paramount
interest in Corea and the right to deem what measures were necessary
Throe months after the conclusiong of the Russo-Japanese War, on
the 17th of November, 1905, the Corean government was compelled to
accept a convention like the following:
Preamble, (the two governments) desiring to strengfren
the principle of solidarity which unites the two governments have
concluded:
Article 1. The government of Japan will here-
after have control and direction of the external relations end
affairs of Corea
In 1906 Marquis I to was appointed as the Japanese
Resident-general in Corea. In 1S07 the Japanese government pre-
vented the representatives of Corea from being given a hearing at
the Hague Conference. Immediately after this case, another con-
33
vention compelled the Corean Emperor to accept:
1. In all matters relating to the reform of Corean
administration the Coreeji government shall receive the instructions
and guidance from the Japanese Resident-General.
4. In all appointments and removals of high officials
the Corean government must obtain the consent of the Resident-Genera ..
32. Anglo-Japanese Agreement of August, 1S05.
53. Eornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the FarEast. p. 315.
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5. The Corean government shall appoint to be officials of Corea,
any Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident-General.
6. The Corean government shall not appoint any
foreigners to be officials of Corea without consulting the Resident-
General.
In 1908 Ito declared that the Japanese government had
no intentions of annexing Cores., and in 1909 he declared that Corea
must be a part of Japan. The final act was taken in 1910. The
Japanese police forces were stationed in all important cities of
Corea and the Corean Ermoeror was compelled to accept a Japanese
34
annexation treaty as follows:
Article 1. His Majesty, the Emperor of Corea makes
complete and permanent cession to His Majest, the Emperor of Japan
of all rights of the sovereignty over the whole of Corea.
Article 2. His Majesty, the Emperor of Jap ah, accepts
the cession mentioned in the preceding article, and consents to
the complete annexation of Corea to the Empire of Japan.
This agreement was signed on August 22, 1910, and
Japan announced the annexation of Corea on August 29, 1910.
This is what Japan meant by fighting with China for the
independence of Corea; this is what Japan meant by guaranteeing the
integrity of that country. Doctor Francis Abbott, sometime in the
Imperial Japanese Naval Academy, says the following: "Finally,
in July, 1894, insurrection broke out in Corea and things came to
a crisis, nothing could have suited the Japanese better
No one is so zealous as the new convert, and certainly Corea has
long been in chronic need of reformation. China feared that Ja,pan
34. Hornbeck: Contemorary Politics in the Far East. p. 213.
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was bent upon annexing Corea - a fear that has been completely
justified by the subsequent events, although it is doubtful it were
35justified at that time.
As a result of the second article of the Chino-Japanese
peace treaty, Russia, Germany, and France promptly compelled Japan
to restore Lio-tung Peninsula and accept a money payment of thirty
36
million taels instead. As the result of the fourth article, Russia
assumed the role of a devoted friend of China against the hostile
Japanese, and loaned her half the money to pay the indemnity, without
security. These power s, however, took such an action, not for the
sake of China, but for themselves. Within two months after the
treaty of Shimmonoseki, the French minister secured some territorial
concessions and commercial privileges of an exclusive character along
the land frontier adjoining their Indo-Chinese territories. These
concessions would affect the Eritish trade interest in South China,
and so Great Britain protested against the violation of China's most
favored nation pledges. China was very helpless to refuse the
French demands. England therefore demanded the privileges of con-
cession under the pretext of equal opportunity. In February 1897,
China, made concession to satisfy England. As to France, in the form
of the cession of certain lands on the north Burmah frontier and
she also made some new trade routes and ports in the south. Russia
thought she greatly helped China against the Japanese aggression, so
she strongly demanded some compensation. In 18S6, she established
the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, the Chinese Russian Bank was
formed as a powerful political instrument in the hands of the Russian
35. Abbott: Japanese Expansion and American Policies, p. 43.
35. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in The Far East. p. SOS.
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government. " China did grant the rights to Russia to project the
Trans-Siberian Railway across North Manchuria, and eighteen months
37
later, to build an extension southward to Port Arthur."
Germany was one of these who compelled the Japanese
to restore Liotung Peninsula to China, so she insisted on getting
compensation from China. Unfortunately the murder of two German
missionaries in Chantung Province in 18S7 gave Germany the oppor-
tunity to seize the possession of Kiaochow Bay without any dip-
lomatic negotiation. On March 6, 1898, the convention was signed
by which Germany secured the lease of Kaio-chow Bay for ninety-nine
years, and also secured some privileges for building some railways
in the province and for the opening of mines along the railways,
to have the first loans to China in case China borrowed money for
38
developing that province.
After Germany occupied Kiaochow, the Russian govern-
ment, in January 1898, demanded of China that Port Arthur should
be leased to Russia by the way of compensation as the Kiaochow had
been leased to Germany. On March 27, 1898, the Liaotung Peninsula,
including an area of 1,300 square miles and Port Author and Tali en-
wan was leased to Russia for a period of twenty-five years. The
French government, in 1897, with the same pretext secured the de-
coration of China's nnon-alienation" that China had no intention
of ceding the Island of Hainan to any other power. Great Britain
likewise secured a promise, February 11, 1898, that China had no
intention of ceding Yangtse Valley to any other power. France then
secured the declaration that China should not cede any part of the
provinces bordering on Tonking. Japan secured the same declaration
37. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in The Far East. p. 234.
38. " « " « n n it ti ti 224.
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in regard to Fukien province. In addition, France leased the Bay
of Kwang-chow for the same term as the German lease in Shangtung, and
Britain's lease for Wei-hai-wei was as long as Russia's. in Port
Arthur.
This scramble of the foreign powers into China was due
to the second article of the Chino-Japanese Peace treaty described
in the foregoing paragraphs. Now I must say a few words about the
Effect of these actions. When the powers got the privilege to build
the railways from one place to another, and even to build a short
line, thousands of graves must be destroyed. This particular act
did much to inflame the Chinese fesling. Again, after Germany
occupied Kiao-Chau, only on the ground of killing two missionaries,
the Chinese distrusted them very much. Moreover, the sudden growth
of foreign influence and their trade, which threatened to disturb
the economic balance of the Chinese conservatives, the ignorant
people began to cry out against the foreigners. A secret socfety
known as Boxers, "half benevolent, half mystical, and wholly patriotic
they undertook to clear their native land of the detested foreigners
39
who profsued it." The Boxers spread out very rapidly, and attacked
the foreign legation in 1900. When the foreign troops reached China,
Peking was captured, and the indemnity of 450,000,000 taeis was paid
to them. At first, Russia began to pour troops in from Siberia to
Manchuria. When the Boxer campaign was ended and peace restored once
more in China, Russia manifested a great reluctance to withdraw any
40
troops from Manchuria." This was the leading cause of the
Russo-
39. Abott: The Japanese Expansion and American
Politics, p. 52.
f „
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Japanese War which I shall discus6 in my next chapter.
On the conclusion of this chapter, the following state-
ment by Doctor Hornbeck, University of Wisconsin, for sometime an
instructor in the Chekiang Provincial College and in the Fengtien Law
College of China, who has traveled and studied for five years in the
Far East, is a very good summary of the diplomatic relations of China
and Japan at the close of the war:
"We have seen elswhere how Japan proceded step by step
between 1875 and 18S5 to sever the ties which had long existed between
China and Corea. It was Japan's forward policy that brought on the
Chino-Japanese war of 1894. Not content with securing the termination
of China's suzerainty over Corea and recognization of the complete
independence of the Corean Kingdom, the Japanese exacted from China
in the treaty of Shi. .onoseki , the cession of Formosa, the Pescadores,
and the South Manchuria. It was this war and the attempt to take from
China a< large and important area near the political heart of the
Empire-tfais, and not Germany's seizure of Shantung two years later-
that marked the first step in the series of aggressions which cul-
minated in the 'scramble for concessions', it was this that raised
the question which soon became an issue: Is China to be partitioned?
The scramble for concessions led indirectly to the Boxer uprising,
the Boxer uprising gave Russia the chance to consolidate her position
in Manchuria, and Russian encroachments in Manchuria led to the
Rus so-Japanese War. Thus did the ambition of Japan contribute to the
41
cause of peace in the Fa>r East.'"
41. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in The Far East. pp. 220.221.
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Chapter II.
The Japanese in Manchuria.
Manchuria today is to the Far East what the Balkan
States have for so long been to Europe. This fertile region, with
an ares, equal to that of France and Germany combined is the focus
of great political ambitions and designs. Immediately after the
Chi no- Japanese War, Russia showed herself very friendly to China,
and secured large privileges and concessions in Manchuria, mention-
ed in the last chapter. During the outbreak of the Boxer uprising,
Russia made herself at home in Manchuria. In the fall of 1900, she
tried to put through an agreement with the Tartar General at Mukeden
whereby a Russian Resident with general powers of control was to be
installed there. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan pro-
tested against the agreement. In December, it became known that
the convention would have made Manchuria a Russian protectorate.
The three great powers renewed their protest against the continued
occupation by the Russian forces. In 1302, on account of Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, Russia modified her position, and made an
agreement vita China, promising gradually to withdraw her forces
from Manchuria, and restore to China the Shanhaikuan-Newchuang-
Hsinmintun Railway which she occupied during the Boxer uprising.
In October, 1903 the Russian evacuation still did not take place.
It was closely estimated that Russia had 45,000 soldiers in
Manchuria. In August, 1903, in consultation with the Russian
Minister at Tokyo, the Japanese minister, Bar an Komura, drafted the
proposal as the following:"**
1. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. p. 247.

1. The Independence and integrity of China and Corea
should be respected and the open door should be preserved.
2. Japan's interests in Corea and Russia's in Man-
churia should be recognized.
3. Each power should be at liberty as to industrial
and commercial activities in its sphere of influence, without inter-
ference from the other.
4. Only sufficient troops should be kept on the
ground to protect interests, and these should be recalled when no
longer needed.
5. Russia should recognize exclusive interests of
Japan in assisting the Corean government.
Russia presented the counter proposals and claimed that
Japan should recognize Manchuria as the outside of her sphere of
influence, but Russia did not mention recognizing Manchuria as
outside of her sphere of interests if Russia would reciprocate by
recognization of Corea as outside of the Russia sphere. Russia
ignored the proposals about Corea and declined to discuss the
Manohurlan questions. Japan again sent a third communication, but
Russia still insisted upon being left absolutely in Manchuria.
Finally Japan sent an ultimatum, and war began.
At the beginning of v;ar, both belligerents made an
agreement that the neutrality of China should be respected, except
in Manchuria, which subsequently became the battle field. As the
result of the war, the Russians were driven out of South Manchuria.
Fnen the Japanese occupied this territory, they treated
the Chinese more severely and unjustifially than the Russians had
done. They put many Chinese to death, those whom they suspected of
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being in favor of the Russians. They requisitioned and confis-
cated the Chinese properties on the ground of military necessity,
but they really used them for the other purposes. The Japanese
military authority issued warrants to seize the goods and imprison
or put to death the possessors. ° The Japanese administration
declared the Russian currency, roubles, illegal in South Manchuria
but at the same time the Japanese agents bought the Roubles from
the Chinese with Japanese war notes. They sent these through the
Yokohama Specie Bank to Tientsin, where they could get full face
value. It was estimated "millions of dollars were squeezed out of
3
the Chinese population by tnis process." Moreover, when the war
was going on, thousands of Chinese abandoned their homes and
properties upon the advance of the Japanese armies. Many of the
noncotnbatant Japanese of the low character lost no time in es-
tablishing themselves on these abandoned homes. As time passed
and partial order was restored in the regions, the Chinese re-
fugees began to return and found their homes being occupied. Ho
Chinese in these coast regions were permitted to open, and so
the Chinese owners could not get justice to restore their propert-
ies.
When the war closed no Japanese soldier set foot on
the Russian soil. Russia still had great influence politically
anc economically in North Manchuria. The Russian generals were
begging the Tzar to continue the conflict, because they knew the
Japanese had been exhausted after their brilliant series of
victories. On account of internal questions in Russia, the
Tzar was willing to make peace with Japan. In the spring of 1S05
2. T. F. Millard: The New Far East. pp. 148-150.
3. " " " " » " 150-153.

39.
the Japanese government requested Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, the
President of the United States, as the mediator, to make peace
with Russia. The peace conference was held at Portsmouth. The
Russian plenipotentiary, Count White, and the Japanese plenipotent-
iary, Baron Kormura, concluded the Portsmouth Treaty of fifteen
4
articles. The important ones concerning China sxq the following:
Article III. To completely and simultaneously evacu-
ate Manchuria, with the exception of the territory over which the
lease of the peninsula of Liaotung extends, in accordance with the
provision of additional article 1. annexed to this treaty, and
(3) To entirely and completely restore to the ex-
haustive administration of China all parts of Manchuria now
occupied by the Russians and the Japanese, or which are under their
control, with the exception of the above mentioned territory.
Article IV. Russia and Japan mutually pledge them-
selves not to place any obstacle in the way of general measures
which apply equally to all nations and which might for the devel-
opment of commerce and industry in Manchuria.
Article V. The Imperial government of Japan, with
the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur,
of Talien, and of the adjacent territories and territorial waters,
as well as the rights, privileges, and concessions connected with
this lease or forming part thereof, and it is likewise ceded to the
Imperial Government of Japan, all the public works and property
within the territory over which the abovement ioned lease extends.
Article VI. The Imperial Government of Russia obli-
gates herself to yield to the Imperial Government of Japan, without
4. The United States Foreign Relations.
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compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the
Ch3.n-Chun (Kwan-Chien-Tsi t and- Port Arthur Railway and all it
3
branches, with all the rights, privileges and property thereunto
belonging within this region, as well as the coal mines in said
region belonging to this railroad or being operated for its
benefit. The two high contracting parties mutually pledge them-
selves to obtain from the Chinese Government the consent mentioned
in the foregoing clause.
Article VII. Russia and Japan agree to operate their
respective railroads in Manchuria for commercial and industrial
purposes exclusively, but by no means for strategic purposes.
It is agreed that this restriction does not apply to
the railroads within the territory covered by the lease of the
Liaotung peninsula.
In addition to article III, the Imperial Governments
of Russia and Japan mutually agree to begin the withdrawal of their
military forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and
immediately after the treaty of peace goes into force, and within
the period of eight months from the date, the armies of the two
powers should be entirely withdrawn from Manchuria, with the
exception of the leased territory of the Peninsula of Liao-tung.
The forces of the two powers occupying advanced positions are to
be withdrawn first.
The high contracting parties reserve the right to
maintain guards for the protection of their respective railroad
lines in Manchuria. The number of these guards shall not exceed
15 men per kilometer.
After the ratification of the Portsmouth Treaty be-
tween Russia and Japan, relating to Manchuria, China and Japan
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opened negotiations for the purpose of solving the complex relations
between the two countries and this treaty was signed in 1905, and
subsequently ratified.
Article I. The Imperial Chinese Government consents to
all transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan by Article V.
and VI. of the treaty of peace.
Article II. The Imperial Japanese Government engage
that in regard to the leased territory as well as in the matter of
railway construction and exploitation, it will, so as circumstances
permit, conform the original agreements concluded between China and
Russia. In case any question arises in the future on these subjects,
the Japanese Government will decide it in consultation with the
Chinese Government.
Supplementary Agreement.
Article I. The Imperial Chinese Government agrees as
soon as possible after the evacuation of Manchuria by the Russian
and Japanese forces, the following cities and towns in Manchuria
will be opened by China herself as the places of international
residentce and trade:- Shingking Province - Fengwangcheng, Liao-yung,
Hoinmintun, Tieling, Tungkiantzu and Fakumen; Kirini Province-
Changchun, Kirin, Harbin, ITinguta, Hunchun and Sangsing, Heilungkiang
Province - Tsitsihar, Hailar, Aihun and Manchuli.
Article IV. The Imperial Government of Japan engages
that Chinese public and private property in Manchuria, which they
have occupied or expropriated on account of military necessity, shall
be restored at the time the Japanese troop3 are withdrawn from
Manchuria, and that property as is no longer required for military
purposes Bhall be restored even before such withdrawal.
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Article VI. The Imperial Chinese Government agrees
that Japan has the right to maintain s.nd work the military railway-
line constructed between Antung and Moukden, and to improve said
line so as to make fit for the conveyance of coramerical and indust-
rial goods of all nations. The term for which such righ is con-
ceded if for fifteen years from the date of the completion of the
improvement above provided for, the work of such improvements to
be completed within two years, exclusive of a period of twenty
months during which work will have to be delayed owing to the
necessity of using the existing road for the withdrawal of troops.
The terra of this concession is therefore to expire in the 49th year
of Kuang Hsu (1923). At the expiration of that term, the said
railway shall be sold to China at a price to be determined by
appraisement of ail its properties by a foreign expert to be se-
lected by both parties.
Article X. The Imperial Chinese Government agrees
that a joint-stork company of forestry, composed of Japanese and
Chinese capitalists, shall be organized for the exploitation of the
forests in the regions on the right bank of the Yalu River, and
that a detailed agreement shall be concluded in which the area and
term of the concession, as well as the organization of the company
and all regulations concerning the joint work of exploitation,
shall be provided for. The Japanese and Chinese stock holders
shall share equally in the profits of the undertaking.
In the foregoing treaties, we have made clear what
the Japanese legal rights over South Manchuria are, those which
Russia has given up, and to what China had consented. How we
are going to examine what Japan has done in Manchuria since the
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Russo-Japanese War.
Did Japan observe Article IV of the Portsmouth Treaty
in which Japan and Russia mutually pledged themselves not to place
any obstacle in the way of general measures which apply equally to
all nations and that which China might adopt for the development
of commerce and industry in Manchuria? In December of 1905, Japan
compelled the Chinese Government to make a reluctant secret protocol.
in which China undertook upon Japan's demand, "not to constuct any
railway lines parallel to and competing with the South Manchuria
5
Railway." The Chinese Government refused to agree to this pro-
tocol although Japan claimed the contrary.
In 1909, Mr. Knox, the Secretary of State of the United
States, resolved to submit to the consideration of the powers, his
plan for the neutralization of the railways, both those existing
and those to be built in Manchuria. Mr. Knox's plan contempla/ted
making Manchuria a neutral area, as far, at least, as railways were
concerned, where all powers should have and be guaranteed as nearly
as possible equal opportunities. What he actually proposed was that
the powers together loan China sufficient money to buy interests
from Japan and Russia, and to construct more railway lines in Man-
churia, all these lines to be properties of China, but their ad-
ministration to be, for the time being, at least, under some sort
of an international commission. The German government and the
British Government gave tentative approval, but the Russian and
Japanese Governments were absolutely against the plan.
What is the meaning and principle of the "open door
policy" and "equal opportunity"? Do these phrases not apply to the
5. Millard: American and Far Eastern Question, p. 548.
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to the idea of commercial neutralization? It is clear that Japan
violated Article IV of the Portsmouth Treaty. "To recapitulate"
says Mr. F. Thomas Millard, in his American and the Far Eastern
Question, "we find that the following issues affecting the soverignty
of China and the Open Door principle within her territory were
sharply defined by the results of Mr. Knox's efforts. First, the
right of China to decide upon the course of railway development with-
in her territory was denied by foreign nations. Secondly, certain
foreign nations declared that the strategical and political interests
must be considered as paramount in planning a railway system within
China's territory. Thirdly, foreign nations have asserted the right
to interfere in business transactions between American citizens and
the Chinese Government, in violation of treaties of the United State s
and China, and of covenants of those Governments with China and the
United States, a doctrine which is susceptible to worldwide appli-
o
c?tion. n It is clear that Mr. Knox's diplomacy did not cause such
results, but it only exposed them and brought them out into the open.
Did Japan observe the Article IV of the additional
agreement between China and Japan, that Japan would restore the
Chinese public and private properties after the war? Many Chinese
moved to the interior of China from Manchuria during the war. When
they came back, after the war was over, they found their properties
were occupied by the Japanese. They tried to get them back from the
Japanese but they always failed. They then protested to the Japanese
authorities, but it was very hard to get any justice from them. "Fnen
I was in Mukdon, I could give many instances like these, " said Mr.
Millard, "many Chinese owners have lost their properties altogether,
3. Thomas F. Millard: Our Eastern Question, pp. 25-26.
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and sometimes lost their lives trying to recover them.
"
Did the Japanese respect the Chinese laws and regulation;
in Manchuria? The Japanese immigrants refused to pay the likin or
internal taxes. The Chinese officers dared not to collect taxes
from them, and the police dared not to interfere with them in such
cases , for it would speedily bring a detachment of the Japanese
troops to the place and might lead to the humiliation of the Chinese
officers. "Fnen I was last in Manchuria, " Mr. Millard said, a
Japanese merchand in a non-treaty town attempted to secure the agency
at that place for a foreign firm by claiming that he could represent
it to better advantage than its Chinese agent, because he (the Jaoan-
8
ese) does not have to pay Likin.
"
Did Japan observe Article IV of the supplement ary agree-
aer
J
" between China and Japan in 1905, that the changing of the An-
tung and Moukden military railway into an industrial and commercial
railway should be completed within two years, exclusive of a period
would
of twelve months during which proceedings /have to be delayed owing
to the necessity of using the existing railway for the withdrawal
of troops? According to this article, Japan should have begun to
improve the railway about the end of the year 1906, and should have
completed it about the end of the year 1S08. Until the end of 1908
the Japanese government neither changed it nor had tried to do so.
This article was naturally nullified on account of Japan's failure
to change the railway during the required period. But Japan dis-
regarded this fact, and in January 1909 suddenly demanded of China
that Japan have the right to construct a new line from Antung to
7. Thomas F. Millard: America and the Far Eastern Question, p. 321
8. " » " " « « " * *>. 257.

Moukden instead of changing the old military line. The Chinese
Government refused to accept this demand. Japan sent an ultimatum
to China that she would take free action if China still refused
Japan's demand. At the same time, Japan ordered her navy and mili-
tary forces to mobilize near China. Under such serious conditions
China had only two alternatives - accept the demand or fight for
her existence. Of course Chine, knew her own weakness, and so she
9
reluctantly yielded to Japan." During the same year, Japan compelled
the Chinese Government to permit the Coresn people to live in the
Tumen River Valley, although they must be under the Chinese court
of jurisdiction. Moreover, she furnished China half the capital for
the completion of the Hsinmintun-Mukden line and for the Kirin-
Changchun line, securing the pledge in connection with the latter
that, if it were to be extended, application for the assistance
should be made to the South Manchuria Railway Company. Besides all
of these, the Japanese also secured complete control of the Fushun
10
Mines, the greatest coal mines in all the Far East. Furthermore,
the Japanese compelled the Chinese owners along the Yalu River to
sell their timbers to the Japanese Company. Some of them were killed
when they refused to sell at the lowest price.
With these developments, the Japanese Government, from
its base in the leased territory end through the consulates and
railway company, went on effectively consolidating and extending its
influence. The result was that the Japanese authorities became
absolute not only in the leased territory and the Railway Zones, but
throughout the whole territory of Southern Manchuria. In 1915, Japan
went further. She secured the right for Japanese people to acquire
S. Lui Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China, pp. 465-470.
10. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. p. 262.
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lands in Manchuria, and prolong the terms of the leased territory
and the Antung-Mukden Railway, to be discussed in the Fourth
Chapter of the Japanese 1 twenty- four Demands.
Have the Japanese discriminated and ruined the commerce
of the other countries in South Manchuria? The Japanese goods were
allowed to pass northward from the leased territory without paying
the custom duties, and the tariff of the South Manchuria Railway
did and does discriminate against the port of Hew Chwang in favor
of Dariein. The Yokohama Specie Bank, on account of government
participation, loaned at the lowest rate of the Japanese in order to
compete with the foreign trade. More serious than this, the Japan-
ese refused to pay the taxes on the Japanes products of Tobacoto
while the American-British Company had to pay taxes on their products
Moreover, the Japanes tried to immitate the trade mark and pictures
and the words of the American-British Company's cigarette packages,
and tried to sell them to the Chinese consumers. When the Chinese
consumers found out that the quality was very poor, they thought
the American-British cigarettes were to blame, not knowing that they
were Japanese imitations. This was the great evidence that the
Japanese intended to ruin the reputation of the American-British
11
Tobacco Company.
What is the Japanese administration in the leased
territory? The Japanese adminstration in the Leased territory in-
cluded an area of 1,303 square miles, and Railway Zones of 70.54
miles. Within the territory, the important cities are Darein and
Port Arthur and the railways are divided into fifty-five stations,
at most of which the Japanese have settlements. There were in the
leased territory at the end of 1913, some 456,000 Chinese and 45,000
11. Hi Hard: America and the Far Eastern Question, pp. 234-236.
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Japanese. In the raiiw. y settlements, some 28,000 Chinese and
35,500 Japanese. The leased territory and Railway Zone are subjected
to the control of Ministry of foreign affairs at Tokyo and are in
the hands of a Governor-General with official headquarters at Port
Arthur. The railway is controlled by the Ministry of Communi cation
in Tokyo. The Governor-General must be an officer of the Imperial
army. He not only has the power of civil affairs and control of
railway guards, but also the diplomatic power of negotiating with
the Chinese authorities.
On the conclusion of this Chapter to summarize what
the Japanese have done in Manchuria:
They confiscated the Chinese properties on the ground
of military necessity; they punished many innocent Chinese by death
on the suspicion of favoring the Russians; they fexiled to restore
the Chinese public and private properties after the war; they denied
the Manchurian railway neutralization; they refused to pay internal
taxes; they compelled the Chinese Government to accept their demands
of building the Antung-Mukden Railway, and opening the Fushsun
Mines; they di scrim: nated and ruined the commerce of the other
countries; they vetoed the important issues of Chinese authorities.
All of these have violated the Open Door Policy, and the Chinese
integrity.
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Chapter III.
The Japanese in Shangtun.
Shangtun is one of the Chinese eastern provinces. It
is situated in the mouth of the Yellow River, to the west of the
Yellow Sea, on the shore opposite to the Liotungtun peninsula, and
the Kingdom of Corea. It has eight hundred miles of coast line.
The strategical points of this province are Weihaiwei which was
leased to Britain in 1898 for twenty-five years, and Kai-chow Bay
which was leased to Germany in the same year for ninety-nine years.
In a few days after the outbreak of the Great War in
Europe, August 4, 1914, there were developments which indicated that
China might be involved by the participation of Japan as a belli-
gerent. China immediately approached the United States and Japan
with a request that these governments use their good offices to
obtain the consent of all belligerents to preserve the neutrality
of all Chinese territory leased to the foreign nations. This -plan
would have included all the leased territories, such as the leased
territory of Kiachow (Germany), the leased territory of Port Arthur
and Dalny, the regions occupied by Russia nnder the Manchurian
railway agreements. It was obvious "by this device all the terri-
tories occupied b- the belligerents and possible belligerents in
China could have been neutralized, any troopa and war materials whict
could not be removed, or interned, and their warlike use prevented.
It was evident that possession was not essential stratigically to
the military and navy operation, 3.nd could have been neutralized
without working disadvantage to either belligerent side." "The
interests of every foreign nation, except Japan," says Millard, and
"the interests of humanity also, would be served by such an agree-

merit, but Japan hastened to block it by interposing the wall of
irrevocable events.
"
On August 15, Japan as an ally of Great Britain in the
agreements of 1902, 1905, and 1811, each to undertake to protect the
interests of the other if those interests were threatened by k third
power, delivered an ultimatum to Germany consisting of two important
propositions: 1
First, to withdraw immediately from Japanese and
Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and
to disarm at once those which can not be withdrawn, and second, to
deliver on a date not later than September 15th, to the Imperial
Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire
leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to the eventual restoration
of the same to China. The Imperial Japanese Government announced
at the same time that in the event of not receiving by noon, August
23, 1814, the answer of the German Imperial Government signifying
unconditional acceptance of the above demand offered by the Imperial
Japanese Government, they would be compelled to take such action as
3
they might deem necessary to meet the situation.
Germany made no reply to Japan. On August 23rd, the
Emperor of Japan, in declaring war on Germany, said:
"Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the
calamitous effect of which we view with grave concern, on our part,
have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by
the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has
at length compel: ed Great Britain, our ally, to open hostilities on
1. Thomas F. Millard: Our Eastern Question, pp. 88-90.
2. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in theFar East. p. 287.
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that country and Germany is at Kiaochow, its leased territory in
China, busy with like preparations, while her armed vessels,
cruising the seas of Eastern Asia, are threatening our commerce
and that of our ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy
"Accordingly, our government, and that of his Britan-
nic Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other,
agreed to take such measures as may he necessary for the protection
of the general interests contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance,
and we, on our part, being desirous to attain that object by peace-
ful rneans, commanded our government to offer, with sincerity, an
advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed
for the purpose, however, our government failed to receive an
answer accepting their advice.
"It is with profound regret that we, in spite of cur
ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare
war.
The real purpose of Js;can will not be difficult to be
discovered. That her part in the European war was not for the peace
of the Far East as declared by her diplomats at the outset, but a
4
move in her ambition to dominate China. The desire to possess
Kiaehow because of its proximity to the island empire supplied the
strongest incentive to Japan to acquire it by any means whenever an
opportunity presented itself. 7»ith the possession of South Llanchuri ,
the Liaotung ptaineula, Corea, and Kiaochow, Japan will have strong
bases for commercial and territorial expansion into regions beyond.
To disguise the real facte end to secure a favorable
opinion from the world, the Japanese Government began a systematic
effort to explain its actions and to relieve the uneasiness that
3. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. pp. 287-288.
4. Jones: The Fall of Tsingai . p. 4.
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such action would cause in Western nations. On the day Japan's
ultimatum to Germany was delivered, Count Okuma, the Premier of
Japan, sent the following telegram to the press of the United States
through the East end WestBureau (New York), the Japanese serni-of ficia .
news In America:^
"Japan's proximity to China breeds many absurd rumors,
but I declare that Japan acts with a clear conscience, in conformity
with justice, and in perfect accord with her ally. Japan has no
territorial ambition, and hopes to stajid as the protector of peace
in the Orient.
"
On August 20th, Baron Kato, the Japanese Minister of
For eignAffairs, communicated to the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan,
the following statement:
"The history of the seizure of the place (Kiaochow)by
Germany and her conduct preceding her intervention in conjunction
with Russia, andFrance, after the Chino-Japanese War, show that it
is absolutely necessary to eliminate such possession completely if
Japan is to restore immediately complete peace in the Far East in
accordsnoe with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. If Japan
is to look far enough into the future and adopt measures to insure
an abiding peace in Eastern Asia, she must realize in the hands of
a hostile military power right in the heart of the country cannot in
itself fail to be a menacing factor.
"
On August 34th, Count Okuma cabled to the New York
Independent a "Message to the American people:
"
"Every sense of loyalty and honour obliges Japan to
5. Thomas F. Millard: Our Eastern Question, p. 98.
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to oooperate with Great Britain to cleb.r from these waters the
enemies who in the past, the present, and the future menace her
interests, her trade, her shipping, and people's lives As
Premier of Japan, I have stated and now again state to the people
of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive,
no desire to secure more territory, no thought to deprive China or
other peoples of anything; which they possess.
My Government and my people have given their word and
their pledge, which will be as honorably kept as Japan always
keeps her promises.
"
In view of such commendable and admirable motives and
assurances In the ultimatum to Germany and in the speeches and
messages of Count Okuma, China should have no cause to fear for the
entrance of Japan into the war. The settlement in the Far East
seemed to assure China and the powers of immediate peace soon after
the reduction of the German lease hold. But China was nevertheless
afraid of witnessing a war in her territory.
In the military operation against Kiaochow, the Japan-
ese landed their troops at a port on the northern coast of Shangtun
nearly one hundred miljs away and used the intervening Chinese soil
as a base of operation. The Chinese Government protested against
the violaticn of its soverign rights but made no resistance, and
then, following the precedent set in the Russo-Japanese War, vol-
untarily declared the war zone about Kiaochow. According to all
neutral opinion, this zone was big enough for any operation which
Japan might carry on against the German stronghold. It looked as if
3. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. p. 390.

China made a wise decision.
On September 2nd, Japanese transports arrived and Lung-
Ken and troops advanced westward, and on September 20th they occupied
Weihsien, which was outside the war zone and then went to Tsinanfu,
the capital of Shantung, which is 256 miles fcom Kiaochow. After
they occupied many other points west, they seized the entire Kiaochow
Tsinan Railway, the property of private Chinese and German individu-
als. Then all the mines along the railway were also seized together
with real property which was susyjected of belonging to Germany.
This was the way Japan treated China during the days
previous to actual operation against Kiaochcv:. A witness writes:
"In all these operations Japan exhibited nc ne of that spirit of
iriendliness towexd Cr*ina, the existence of which was suggested by
the promise to restore Kiaochow, and proclaimed by Premier Count
Okuma and other responsible spokesmen of Japan. She in no case
showed any appreciation of the painful position in which China was
S
placed, but on the contrary her actions were brusque and provocative."
Then in view of this situation, we can only conclude that Japan was
bent upon much bigger things than merely the defense of the interests
of her ally and the peace of the Far East.
Another description of Japan's military operation agains
Kiaochow is presented by Professor Jenks, thus: "Before Tsingtau
was taken, she (Japan) scattered her troops over Shangtun, in a
manner which 'military necessity 1 could not pretend to explain, this
and her truculent attitude toward Cninese officials begot and com-
pelled Chinese resentment. Some of the details of Japanese campaigns
7. T. F. Millard: Our Eastern Question, p. 107
8. Millard: Our Eastern Question, pp. 108-109.
9. Crow: Japan and America, p. 263.

in Shangtun, confirmed to me personally in a way which establishes
their truth beyond question, cried aloud to Heaven for vengeance.
There are some things so unspeakable that attempt to excuse them
merely makes bad worse. The conduct of responsible Japanese officers
toward the Chinese women of Shangtun marks and ugly page in the
annuals of Japanese warfare, which a friendly world had placed upon
a very high plane, indeed. The Kokusai (Japan's official news
service) has seen to it that due credit has been given to Japan's
treatment of German prisoners and enemy traders. Not a word has
been published about the hundred of Chinese women and girls forced
by Japanese officials to become the victims of Japanese lust. The
story of how, upon their knees, in agony and in shame, with blood
extracted from the tips of their fingers, they wrote their pathetic
appeal to the Chinese Government, how the Chinese commissioners
were received with contemptuous amusement, has yet to be written.
I should not care to write the fact that the women were eventually
released docs not excuse the shameful deed. This is one of Japan's
acts in China for which she cannot hope to make amend.
Furthermore, Professor Jenks proceeded with his discuss-
ion. "Japan had a great opportunity to secure China, herself, and
humanity, when quite legitimately, she attacked the German strong-
hold of Tsingtan. Instead of arriving to this opportunity, because
of her spirit of opportunities, she rode roughshod from one blunder
to another. First, she ignored China's declaration of neutrality,
paid absolutely no attention to the war zone, arranged according to
Russo-Japanese precedent. She landed her troops at Lungkow, forcibly
1C. Jenks: Japan's Act in China, in World's Work. Jan. 1917.

Itrampling China's protest. She pleaded military necessity, Germany's
excuse for violating the neutrality of Belgium."
11
Mr. J. Jones, another eye-witness to the Japanese war
operation, writes the following statement in his "Fall of Tsingtsau:
"By this unnecessary action Japan had violated the
neutrality of China, and though England had joined in the European
War because Germany had violated the neutrality of Belgium, the
British Government for some reason unknow, did not think it necessary
when all the eyes of the world were upon Europe, to protest loudly,
to her ally in China, against the very thing that had seemingly so
shocked her in Belgium.
"
But Japan's ambition did not stop her. After the
capture of Kiaooliow^she showed absolutely no sign of retiring from
Shangtun Province. On the contrary* she proceeded systematically
to establish her authority in the places already occupied and to
extend it over Shangtun Province. Garrisons were stationed along
the Tainan-Tsingtau Railway, and at Tsinan-fu, the capital of the
Province; at Lungkow, Wei-shien, and other important ports. By a
gradual and at times subtle process, Chinese police communication
and other local administrative functions were negatived and usurped,
after the system which had been employed and perfected in Corea and
Manchuria. An influx of a low class of Japanese immigration
followed on the heels of the Japanese military. A year after the
occupation, an official report shoned 16,000 Japanese in the city
12
of Tsingtun.
Besides these, she went further and confiscated some
Chinese property as well as the German private property; she
appointed the Japanese as the officers of the Chinese Custom House
11. Jenks: Japan's Act in China, in World's Work. Jan. 1317. p. 323.

at Tsingtau; sh3 forced the Chinese Government to grant more
privileges beyond what she inherited from Germany by the unreasonabl
demands in 1915. All of these facts indicated that Japan had no
intention of restoring Kiaochow to China. Most European powers
consider that Germany is the menace to the peace of Europe. China
can not out come to the conclusion that Japan occupies the same
position in respect to the Far East.
13. Millard: Our Eastern Question p. 114-115
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Chapter IV.
J 3.p an 1 s Demand s
.
In the history of all nations, seldom can be found a
document from one sovereign stata to another such as the demands
Japan presented to China on January 18, 1915. Guiltless of
offense was China but Japan, with no shadow cf excuse, presented
to her a document which has all but robbed the Celestial Kingdom
of sovereignty. In the presentation of these demands, the
Chinese government knew clearly that Japan was trying to dominate
China; but on the other hand, the Japanese Government pretended
"to adjust matters to meet the new situation created by the war
betv/e^n Japan and Germany, to bring closer the friendly relations
existing between Japan and China, and thus to insure the permanent
peace of the Far East.
"
x
I intend now to show what the Japanese
ambitions really were.
The following, which is an officially verified translation
of the note handed to the President of China by the Japanese
Minister on the date mentioned, will show clearly the extent of
the dream of dominating China:
I.
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government being
desirous of maintaining the geners.l peace in Easterr Asia
and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbor-
hood exist..ng between the two nations agree to the following
arti cles
:
Article 1. The Chinese Government engages
to give full
assent to all matters upon which the Japanese
Government may
1. Japan's Official Conmunique. p. 1.
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hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the dispo-
sition of all rights, interests, and concessions, which Germany
by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the
Province of Shantung.
Article 2. The Chinese Government engages that
within the Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory or
island will be ceded or leased to a third power under any pretext.
Article 3. The Chinese Government consents to
Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the
Ki aochow-Tsinanfu Rai Iway
.
Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the
interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by
herself as soon as possible certain important cities and towns in
the Province of Shantung as commercial ports. What places shall be
opened are to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement.
II.
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government,
since the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special
position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia, agrees to the following articles:
Article 1. The two contracting parties mutually
agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term
of lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mulcden
Railway shal be extended to the period of 99 years.
Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to lea.se or own land
required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and
manufacture or for farming.
Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to resid ;
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and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to
engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.
Article 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to
Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened,
they shall be decided upon jointly.
Article 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in res-
pect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese
Government * s consent shall be first obtained before action is taken:
(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of
a third power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third
power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia.
(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third power
pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia as security.
Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the
Chinese Government employs political, financial or military ad-
visers or instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia,
the Japanese Government shall be first consulted.
Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the
control and management of the Kirin-Chang Chun Railway shall be
handed over to the Japanese Government for a term of 99 years
dating from the signing of this Agreement.
III.
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government,
seeing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Company have
close relations with each other at present and desiring that the
common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the
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following articles :-
Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree
that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall
be made a joint concern of the two nations and they further agree
that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her
own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of
the said Company nor cause the said Company to disx>ose freely of the
same.
Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines
in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall
not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be
worked by other persons outside of the said Company; and further
agrees that if it is desired to carry out by any undertaking which,
it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests
of the said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be
obtained.
IV.
» The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government with
the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of
China agrees to the following special article :-
The Chinese engages not to cede or lease to a third
Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.
V.
Article 1. The Chinese Government shall emply influen-
tial Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military
affairs.
Article 2. Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools
in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.
Article 3. Insomuch as the Japanese Government and the
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Chinese Government have many cases of dispute between Japanese and
Chinese police to settle cases which cause no little misunderstand-
ing, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of
important places (China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese
and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall
employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to
pljn for the improvement of the Chinese police service.
Article 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed
amount of munitions of war (say 50$ or more) of what is needed by
the Chinese Government or that there shall be established in China
Chino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts
are to be employed and Japanese materials to be purchased.
Article 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of
constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang,
another line between Nanchang and Hung-chow, and another between
Nanchang and Chaochou.
Article 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines,
build railways and construct harbour-works (including dock-yards)
in the Province of Fukien
,
Japan shall be first consulted.
Article 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall
have the right of missionary propaganda in China.
The manner of presenting these demands was very unusual.
Instead of presenting them to the Chinese foreign office, the
Japanese Minister, Mr. Hioki, formally requested an interview with
the President of the Chinese Republic. By such an action it is
obvious that Japan has violated the diplomatic usage of modern
civilized countries. Before the Japanese Minister interviewed Yuan
Shin Kai, the Chinese President, most people thought it the purpose
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of Mr. Hioki to discuss some matters relating to Shantung or perhaps
he wished to carry personally to the President the pleasant assur-
ances of Japan's consideration and friendship, which Count Okuma
previously had conveyed through mutual friends, or perhaps Mr. Hioki'
2
call was simply formal. On the morning of January 18, the Japanese
legation sent the President a direct copy of the demands, which had
to he hurridly translated. On the evening of the same day, Mr. Hioki
called on Yuan Shi Kai. After the usual formalities, the Japanese
minister began the presentation of the demands by some remarks. Then
he proceeded to read the demands. Yuan Shi Kai sat with an express-
ionless face and did not interrupt. After Mr. Hioki made some ex-
tended remarks to the effect that, in order to prevent complications,
neither the Chinese Government nor the Japanese should give out the
information which had been given to Chins, until the questions were
settled. Mr. Hioki further said that if China failed to meet the
Japanese advice in a satisfactory manner or delayed in adjusting the
questions, it might not be possible for Japan to continue to re-
strain the activities of the Chinese revolutionists then sojourning
3
in Japan. With the usual polite remarks, the interview was ended.
As shown by the scope and character of the demands, Japan
was trying to bring about the establishment of a suzerainty over
China. Therefore she compelled China not to communicate her situa-
tion to other Powers and not to give publicity to these demands. In
short, Japan put the sword at China's throat, and intended to impose
star-chamber proceedings until China's assent was procured. "To
accomplish this Japan used widespread control and influence over the
2. Millard: Our Eastern Question, p. 130.
3. " " " " p. 131.

international publicity relating to Far Eastern affairs, to prevent
the news about her demands from getting out, and after it began to
leak, to obscure the truth by denies and evasions. " Count Okuma,
for instance, on April 3, had declared, 'Japan has not demanded the
appointment of Japanese advisers,' also that 'in Shantung Japan is
4
only asking for what China has already granted to Germany. '
"
Furthermore, the Japanese editors insisted that China was misrepre-
5
senting the substances of the demands. Until the legations of the
Powers in Peking had comprehended the immense importance of matters,
and had communicated the full text of Japan's demands to their
governments, until the foreign officers made inquiries of the Japan-
ese ambassadors there and made inquiries of the Tokyo Government,
the Japanese Government gave no information. After the inquiries of
the Powers had been made, the Japanese Government furnished them a
memorandum of eleven articles as follows:
I.
In relating to the Shantung Province.
Article 1. Engagement on the part of China to consent
to all matters that may be agreed upon between Japan and Germany
with regard to the disposition of all rights, interests and con-
cessions, which in virtue of treaties or otherwise Germany possesses
in relation to the Province of Shantung.
Article 2. Engagement not to alienate or lease upon any
pretext the Province of Shantung or any portion thereof and any
island lying near the eoast of the said province.
Article 3. Grant to Japan the right of contruction of a
4. Hornbeck: Contemr.orary Politics in the Far East. p. 339.
5. " " " « » « "p. 305
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railway connecting Chifu or Lungkow and the Tsinan-Kiaochou Railway.
Article 4. Addition of open marts in the Province of
Shantung.
II.
In relation to south Manchuria and eastern inner
Mongolia.
Article 1. Extension of the terms of the lease of Kwang-
tung, the South Llenchurian Railway, and the Antung-Mukden Railway.
Article 2. (a) Ac uisition by the Japanese of the right
of resident and ownership of land. (b) Grant to Japan of the mining
rights of mines specified by Japan.
Article 3. Obligation on the part of China to obtain in
advance the consent of Japan if she grants railway concessions to any
x--ird Pov.er, or procures the supply of capital from any Power for
railway construction or loan from any other Power on the security of
any duties or taxes.
Article 4. Obligation on the part of China to consult
Japan before employing advisers or tutors regarding political, finan-
cial or military matters.
Article 5. Transfer of the management and control of the
Kirin-Changchun Railway to Japan.
III.
Agreement in principle that, at an opportune moment in the
future, the Eanyehping Company should be placed under Japanese and
Chinese cooperation.
IV.
Engagement in accordance with the principle of the rnain-
tainance of the territorial integrity of China, not to alienate or

lease any ports any bayson, or any island near, the coast of China.
By means of the above eleven articles from which she
omitted the most objectionable demands, Japan attempted to deceive
the governments of the Powers, but, concerning the original 21
drastic demands, continued to press the negotiations, threatening
China with force.
The original demands, were divided into five groups, each
referring to a particular subject. The first four were introduced
by cleverly constructed preambles, but the fifth has no introduction
and explanation. The characteristics of these five groups are of
three types: in some cases Japan asked for options; in others, to
exercise the veto pov;,;rs over the actions of the Chinese Government;
in the third, to have for herself a position of definite, immediate,
direct, and important special privilege.
Group I related to the Province of Shantung. Japan
demanded not only that all German holdings should be turned over to
Japan, but also demanded privileges which Germany never had. These
were as follows: That China should not lease to other countries any
territory on the coasts of Shantung; that she should grant to Japan
the right to construct a new railway in Shantung, and a line from
Tungchow near Chefoo to Weihsien. This latter demand arose because
of the stand taken by China on two previous occasions. In the first
of these the Chinese decided to construct the line in question for
and by themselves. In the second place, it became China's railway
policy no longer to give concessions to foreign powers or to have
railways built by foreigners and with foreign capital. China and
the world had learned from the experience of Manchuria, that railways
in Russian and Ja/cancse hands had been not alone the instruments of
economic advantage but used also for the furtherance of their own
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aims.
Groi p II related to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The
articles are in complete contravention of the "Open Door" principle
and are in violation of Japanese treaties with the other powers, and
subordinate Chinese administration in those regions to Japan »s
authorities. If China wanted advice upon affairs in these regions,
Japan must be selected; if Qniaa wanted to borrow foreign capital
to build railways, to get loans on the security of local taxes,
Japan's consent must be obtained. The Japanese people were to be
allowed to enjoy free travel, engage in business, and in manufacture
of any sort, lease or own land and erect buildings, and open mines
through the regions. These last mentioned provisions would have
three immediate effects: In the first place, they would arouse
feelings of hostilities between Chinese and Japanese subjects; in the
second place, they would increase the difficulty of China's protectio]
of foreigners in China; third and the most important, the Chinese
people arc comparatively poor, and on the other hand, the foreigners
are rich. If the foreigners are allowed to purchase freely cheap
7
land in China, the Chinese people will suffer a great disadvantage.
In addition to the above effects, the other great fact is that where
Japanese traders go, there Japanese officials will go, where official
j
go, soldiers will go; at every turn the authority of China will be
diminished and that of Japan increased. "In the guise of peaceful
commerce and colonization, the process is really one of military and
political invasion, preparing the way for absorption without battle.
Group III. related to the great Hayehping Company whose
iron and steel mills are located at Hankow, where the coal and iron
6. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. pp. 312-313.
7. T. Fl Millard: Our Eastern Question, p. 151.
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are nesx at hand, and whore the heart of the British share of in-
fluence is found. Now the Japanese asked not only for a partnership
in the Company but also the control of the Company, not only to pre-
vent foreigners and Chinese from opening any mines in all the region
round about, but also to prevent any enterprise which would
, in the
opinion of the Japanese, be held likely directly or indirectly to
affect the interests of the Company.
Group IV. related to the entire coast line of China. Thsse
demands were on the one hand negative and on the other hand positive
in their forms. The one prohibits China from disposing of her
territory to any third power; the latter allows China to dispose of
her territory to Japan only.
Group V. was most drastic and unreasonable. It would
reduce China to a place of a vassal of Japan, by making her relations
almost identical with those between Great Britain and Egypt before
the present war, and with the relation of Japan to Corea before the
annexation. China must employ Japanese advisers in political, finan-
cial, military affairs; China must admit Japanese to participate in
the policing of the important places; China must purchase at least
fifty per cent of her amunition from Japan and allow Japan to estab-
lish an arsenal in China; China must grant Japan the privilege of
building important railway lines in Yangtse Valley; China must allow
the Japanese to carry on missionary propaganda and own lands for
hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior: China mu3t give
first option for furnishing capital for development (including dock
yards) in Fukien Province to Japan. The most astonishing and serious
demands were those concerning the police power and purchase of arms.
If China granted the first one, her soeverignty would be abrogated ani
she would be unable to administer her own affairs.
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If she granted the second one, she would be at the mercy of Japan.
If she granted these along with other demands, she would be assigned
to a position as a protectorate of Japan.
This Chinese official statement showed clearly her opinion
regarding the demands:
"Of the twenty-one original demands there were six, as
previously mentioned, to which China could not agree on the ground
that they were not proper subjects for international negotiation,
conflicting as they did with the sovereign rights of China, the
treaty rights of other Powers, and the principle of equal opportunity
"Thus, for example, the second article of the Hanyehping
question in the original Third Group in particular, seriously affsct-
ed the principle of equal commercial and industrial opportunity.
"The proposal that there should be joint administration
by China and Japan of the police in China was clearly an interference
with the Republic's domestic affairs, and consequently an infringment
of her sovereignty. For that reason the Chinese Government could not
take the demand into consideration. But when it was explained by the
Japanese Minister that this referred only to South Manchuria, and he
suggested that his Government would be satisfied if China agreed to
engage Japanese as police advisers for that territory, the Chinese
government accepted the suggestion.
"The two articles r slating to the acquisition of land for
schools, hospitals, and temples, as well as to the right of mission-
ary propaganda, would, in the opinion of the Chinese Government,
have presented grave obstacles to the consolidation of the friendly
feeling subsisting between the two people. The religions of the two
countries are Identical and therefore the need for a missionary pro-
'oa^anda to be carried on in China by Japanese does not exist. The

natural rivalry between Chinese and Japanese followers of the same
faith would tend to create incessant disputes and friction. Whereas
western missionaries live apart from the Chinese communities among
which they labour, Japanese monks would live with the Chinese, and
the similarity of their physical characteristics, their religious
garb, and their habits of life would render it impossible to die-
ting ish them for the purposes of affording the protection which the
Japanese Government would require 3hould be extended to them under
the system of extraterritoriality now obtaining in China. Moreover,
a general apprehension exists among the Chinese people that these
peculiar conditions favouring conspiracies for political purposes
might be taken advantage of by some unscrupulous Chinese.
"The demand for railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley
conflicted with the Allanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Agreement of
March 3, 1908, the Nanking-Changsha RsAlway Agreement of March 31,
1314, and the engagement of August 24, 1914, giving preference to
British firms for the projected line from Nanchang to Chaochowfu.
For this reason the Chinese Government found themselves unable to
consider the demand, though the Japanese Minister, while informed
of China's engagements with Great Britain, repeatedly pressed for
its accerjtance.
"In respect to the demand for the appointment of influen-
tial Japanese to be advisers in political, financial and military
affairs, the policy of the Chinese Government in regard to the
appointment of advisers has been similar to that which has presumably
guided the Japanese Government in like circumstances, namely the
selection of the best qualified men irrespective of their nationalil
As an indication of their desire to avail themselves of the services
of eminent Japanese, one of the earliest appointments made to an
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advisership was that of Dr. Ariga, while later on Dr. Hirai and Mr.
Ilakayama were appointed to the Ministry of Communications.
"It was considered that the demand that Japanese should he
appointed in the three most important administrative departments, as
well as the demand for the joint control of China's police, end the
demand for an engagement to purchase a fixed amount of arms and
ammunitions from Japan or establish joint arsenals in China, so
clearly involved the soverignty of the Republic that the Chinese
Government was unable even to consider them.
"For these reasons the Cninese Government, at the very out-
set of the negotiations, declared that they were unable to negotiate
on the demands, but, in deference to the wishes of the Japanese Minis-
ter, the Chinese delegates consented to give the reasons for declining
to enter into a discussion of them."
Having finished the analysis of the demands, I am going to
describe the conditions of negotiations between the two countries.
"China approached the pending conferences in utmost friendliness and
with a determination to deal with all questions frankly and sincerely.
From February 2, when the negotiations were commenced, to April
17, twenty-four conferences were held in all. Throughout this whole
period the Chinese Government steadfastly strove to arrive at an
8
ami cable settlement and made every concession possible. "
At the beginning of netoiations, the Japanese Minister
demanded that Chinese officials should in the main agree to all the
demands, but China refused. On February 12, the Chinese Government
submitted an official statement expressing its opinion of each demand
and its willingness to agree to twelve of the twenty-one. On February
3, C'.-inese Official Statement, p. 3.
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20th, the Japanese Minister still insisted upon the whole 21 demands
as the basis for negotiations. On February 35th and 38th, the Chin-
ese pointed out that in Inner Mongolia, unlike in Manchuria, special
privileges could not be granted to Japan. Early in March, the Chinese
acceded to the demands for the extension of the lease in South Man-
churia, and also agreed to the principle, with some modification, con-
cerning loans, mining rights, and advisers in South Manchuria. Later
in March, China declared her willingness to agree to the demands to
permit Japaneseto settle and own land in the interiro of Eastern
Inner Mongolia and South Manchuria, if the Japanese would be subjected
to Chinese jurisdiction. At this time, the Japanese began to dis-
patch troops not only to Manchuria, but also to Shantung, Hankow, and
other places.
At the fourteenth conference, the Chinese Government pro-
fessed to agree in principle, but not in detail, to the demands con-
cerning the Hayelping Company. With regard to the fourth group,
China agreed that she would not alienate any island, port, or harbor
on the coast to any third power, but offered to make declaration on
her own responsibility, however not agreeing that Japan had any special
right to require such declaration. At this conference, the Chinese
Minister of Foreign Affairs explained to the Japanese Minister why
China was unwilling to let the Japanese missionaries carry their
propaganda into China. During the next conferences, they discussed
the question of the residence of Japanese in South Manchuria. More-
over, Mr. Hioki suggested that China should make railway concession
in the Yangtze Valley to the Japanese, and allow Japan to settle with
Great Britain. No conferences were held between April 17 and April
29, because Japan waited to find out what the reply of Sir Edward
Grey to the British House of Commons would be.

3.
On April 33, the Japanese Minister presented a revised list
of twenty-four demands announcing that this communication was final*
The articles are enumerated as follows:
Group I
.
Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full
assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereaftei
agree with the German Government, relating to the disposition of all
rights, interests, and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of
treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of
Shantung.
Article 3. (changed into an exchange of notes) The Chinese
Government declares that withint the Province of Shantung and along
the coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any 'Power
under any pretext.
Article 3. The Chinese Government consents that as regards
the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow, to
connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing to
abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China
will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.
Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest
of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China her-
self as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of
Shantung as commercial ports.
(Supplementary exchange of notes)
The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and
the regulations are to be drafted by the Chinese Government, but the
Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.
Group II.
Article 1. The two contracting Powers mutually agree that

34.
that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of
the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway, shall
be extended to 39 years.
(Supplementary exchange of notes)
The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in
the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the
South Manchuria Railway to China shall fall due in the Gist year of
the Republic or 2003. Article 13, in the original South Manchuria
Railway Agreement that it may be redeemed by China after 36 years
after the traffic is opened, is hereby cancelled. The term of the
Antung-Hukden Railway shall expire in the S6th year of the Republic
or 3007.
Article 3. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may lease
or purchase the necessary land for erecting suitable buildings for
trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.
Article 3. Japanese subject shall be allowed to reside
and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manu-
facture of any kind whatsoever.
Article 3a. -The Japanese subjects referred to in the
preceding two articles, besides being required to register with local
authorities, passports which they must procure under the existing
regulations, shall also submit to police laws and ordinances and
tax regulations, which are approved by the Japanese consul. Civil
and criminal cases in which the defendants axe Japanese shall be
tried and adjudicated by the Japanese consul; those in which the
defendants are C/.inese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese
authorities. In either case an office can be deputed to the court
to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese
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and Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjucated by dele-
gates of both nations co- jointly, in accordance with Chinese law and
local usage. When the judicial system in said region is completely
reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects
shall be tried entirely by the Chinese law courts.
Article 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.
)
The Chinese Government agrees that Japanese subjects shall
be permitted forthwith to investigate, select, and then prospect for
and open mines at the following places in South Manchuria, apart from
those mining areas inwhioh mines are being prospected for or worked;
until the mining ordinance is definitely settled, methods at present
in force sh3.11 be followed:
Province of Feng-tien
DISTRICTLOCALITY
Niu Hsin Tai
Tien Shih Fu Kou
Sha Sung Kang
T'ieh Ch'ang
uan Ti T'ang
An Shan Chan region
Pen-hsi
Pen-hsi
Hai-lung
T 'ung-hua
Chin
From Liao-yang to
Pen-hsi
MINERAL
Coal
11
11
11
11
Iron
Province of Kirin (Southern portion)
Sha Sung Kang
Kang Yao
Ho-lung
Chi-lin
(Kirin)
Hua-tien
Coal and iron
Coal
Gold.Chin ?'i Kou
Article 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes.
)
The Chinese Government declares that China will hereafter
provide funds for building railways in South Manchuria; if foreign
capital is required the Chinese Government agrees to negotiate for a
loan with Japanese capitalists first.
Article 5 a. (Changed to an exchange of notes. )
The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when a foreign

loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of South Manchuria
(not including customs and salt revenue on the security of which loan
have already been made by the Central Government), it will negotiate
for the loan with Japanese capitalists first.
Article 3. (Changed to an exchange of notes.
)
The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if foreign
advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police
matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese will be em-
ployed first.
Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make
a fundamental revision of the Kir in-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement,
taking as a standard the provisions in railway loan agreements made
heretofore between China and foreign financiers. If, in future, more
advantageous terms than those in the existing railway loan agreements
are granted to foreign financiers, in connection with railway loans,
the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance with Japan's
wi she s
.
Chines Counter-Proposal to Article 7.
All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to
Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this conven-
tion, remain in force.
Matters Relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia.
1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when a
foreign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of eastern
inner Mongolia, China must negotiate with the Japanese Government
first.
2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will herself
provide funds for building the railways in eastern inner Mongolia;
if foreign capital re-.uired, she must negotiate with the Japanese

Governmen t fi r s t
.
3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest cf trade
and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as
soon as possible, certain places suitable in eastern inner Mongolia
as commercial ports. The places which ought to be opened exe to
be chosen and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese
Government, but the Japanese minister fiiust be consulted before making
a decision.
4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly
to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental
thereto, the Chinese Government shall give its permission.
Group III.
The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company
being very intimate, if the interested party of the said company comes
to an agreement with the Japanese capitalists for cooperation, the
Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent thereto. The
Chinese Government furthe r agrees that without the consent of the
Japanese capitalists, Cnina will not convert the company into a
state enterprise, nor confiscate it, nor cause it to borrow and use
foreign capital other than Jape.nese.
Article IV.
Cina to give a pronouncement by herself in accordance with
the following principle:
Ho bay, harbor, or island along the coast of China may be
ceded or leased to any Power.
NOTES TO BE EXCHANGED.
A.
As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang to
connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, the Nan chang-Hangchow Rail-
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way, and. the Nanchang-Chaoochow Railway, if it clearly ascertained
that other Powers have no objection, China shall grant the said right
to Japan.
B.
As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang
to connect with the Klukiang-Nanehang Railway, a railway from Nanchang
to Kangchow and another from Nanchang to Chaochow, the Chinese Govern-
ment shall not grant the said right to any foreign Power before Japan
comes to an understanding with the other Power which is heretofore
interested therein.
hotes to be Exchanged.
The Chinese Government agrees that no nation whatever is
to be permitted to construct, on the coast of Fukiei, Province, a
Dockyard, a coaling station for military use, or a navy base, nor to
be authorized to set up any other military establishment. The Chinese
Government further agrees not to use foreign capital for setting up
the above mentioned constructions or esta/clishments.
Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as follows:
1. The Chinese Government shall, however, in the future,
if it considers this step necessary, engage numerous Japanese Advis-
ers.
2. Whenever, in the future, Japanese subjects desire to
lease or purchase land in the interior of China for establishing
schools or hospitals, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its
consent thereto.
3. When the suitable opportunity arises in the future,
the Chinese Government will send military authorities to Japan to
negotiate with Japanese military authorities in the matter of pur-
chasing arms or that of establishing a joint arsenal.
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Mr. Hioklj the Japanese Minister, stated as follows:
As relates to the question of the right of missionary pro-
paganda, the same shall he taken up again for negotiation in the
£utur e
.
When the Japanese Minister presented this revised list to
the Chinese Government, he declared that if China could consent to
the whole group without revision, Japan would restore Kiaochow to
China at an opportune time and subject to certain conditions. In
this revision, it was found that all the items of the original group
V. still appeared in or_e form or another, although Ihis group had been
explained as only representing wishes.
In the reply to the revised demands, the Chinese Minister
of Foreign Affairs read a memorandum containing a resume of what had
been China's attitude and a summary of the concessions which had
9been made in the course of the negotiation. This memorandum declared
"As regards the demands in the fifth group, they all in-
fringe on China's sovereignty, the treaty rights of other powers, or
the principle of equal opportunity Accordingly, China has
declared from the very beginning that while she entertains the most
profound regard for Japan's wishes she was unable to admit that any
of this matter could be ms'.de the subject of an understanding with
Japan. Much as she desired to pay regards to Japan' s wishes, China
csn not but respect her own soveEign rights and the existing treaties
with other powers. In order to be rid of the seed for the future
misunderstanding and to strengthen the basis of the friendship, China
was constrsined to iterate the reasons for refusing in the fifth
group, yet in view of Japan's wishes, China had expressed her readi-
l. Chinese Official Statement, pp 39-34.
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ness to state that no foreign money was borrowed to construct harbor
works in Fukien Province.
"
The Japanese Minister replied at once and withdrew the
promises for the restoration of Kiaochow. The Japanese Government
prepared an ultimatum which was delivered to their Minister in Peking
on May Sth. The Chinese people urged their government to resist
Japan, if necessary, by force of arms but Yuan Shi-Kai, knowing that
such a course would be futile, authorized his ministers tc make
further concessions. The Japanc-s refused any more discussion, and
presented the ultimatum on May 7th, giving China forty-eight hours
to reply to the demands. The important features of the ultimatum
are as follows:
"The reason why the Imperial Government opened the present
negotiation with the Chinese Government is first to endeavor to dis-
pose of the complications arising out of the war between Japan and
Germeny, and secondly to attempt to solve those various questions
j
which are detrimental to the intimate relations of China and Japan
with a view to solidifying the foundation of cordial friendship sub-
sisting betv.een the two countries to the end that the peace of the
Far East may be effectually and permanently preserved. With this
object in view, definite proposals were presented to the Chinese
Government in January of this yesjc, and up to today as many as twenty-
five conferences have been held with the Chinese Government in per-
fect sincerity and frankness "
"On the first of May, the Chinese Government delivered the
reply to the revised proposals of the Japanese Government, contrary
to the expectations of the Imperial Government. The Chinese not
only did not give a careful consideration to the revised proposals
but even with regard to the offer of the Japanese Government to

restore Ki 20 chow to them did not manifest the least appreciation for
Japan's good will.
"So in spite of this ungratefulness, they reconsidered the
feelings of the government of their neighboring country and, with
the exception of the article relating to Fukien, which is to be the
subject of an exchange of notes as has already been agreed upon by
the representatives of both nations, undertake to detach the Group
V. from the present negotiation and discuss it separately in the
future. Therefore the Chinese Government should appreciate the
friendly feelings of the Imperial Government by immediately accept-
ing withput any alteration, all the articles of Groups I, II, III,
and IV and the exchange of notes in connection with Fukien province
in Group V. as contained in the revised proposals presented on the
26th of April.
"The Imperial Government hereby again offers its advice
and hopes that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give
a satisfactory reply by 6 o'clock p.m. on the 9th day of May. It is
hereby declsred that, if no satisfactory reply is received before or
at the specified time, the Imperial Government will take steps they
10
may deem necessary.
"
At this moment, Japan decided to prepare to win her
desires by force. General Oka, Minister of War, at ence conferred
with General Akashi, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, and in a few
hours Japan was mobilizing her war fleet as well as her troops, in
preparation for an invasion of China. The Thirteenth Division and
South Manchurian Guards at Mukden and Liaoyoung began preparations
to contend with the Chinese Twenty-Seventh and Twenty-Eighth Divisior
The advance guard moved to confront the Chinese Fifth Division. The
10. The Chinese Official Statement, pp. 3S-43.
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Japanese cruisers were ordered to the Gulf of Cnili to pick up the
Japanese Minister from Peking. China at the same time had a difficult
question before her. She realized that she was not strong enough
and powerful enough to contend with Japan. If war came about, she
would lose more. Moreover, she saw clearly that the demands of the
ultimatum contained little of importance to which China had not
aready agreed. The most drastic demands in the fifth group such as
the employment of advisers, the establishing of schools and hospitals,
the railway concessions in South China, the supply of arms and
ammunition and the establishing of arsenals, and the propaganda of
Buddhism, were to be postponed for later negotiation. Furthermore,
if the Chinese Government accepted the demands of the ultimatum,
the Japanese Government would restore Kiaochcw with certain conditions.
Under these circumstances, Yuan chose the wise course. He
conceded what he had to and made such exception as he could, hoping
that China would get a hearing before civilization later. Moreover,
China hoped for the intervention of other powers, but the help did
not arrive. China was forced to agree to Japan's demands. "At
half past one o'clock on the morning of Sunday, May 9th, China, the
oldest nation in the world, passed under the virtual domination of
11
Japan. "
11. Jones: The Fall of Tsingtau. p. 207.
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Chapter V.
Conclusion.
I have shown that Japan absorbed Corea, step by step
stealing from C. ina; I have shown that Japan usurped South Manchuria
and discriminated against the other nations; I have shown that Japan
violated the Chinese neutrality in Shantung; and I have shown and
set forth at length the nature of the Japanese demands. The position
of Japan towards China in their own oyes is that "of magnanimous
liberators who have saved her from servitude to Europeans, of wise
teachers who have imported to her the lessons necessary for her
regeneration, of kindly guides who will direct her footsteps along
the paths that lead to future greatness. " But, in the eyes of the
C .inese, they look at the matter differenty: "It was Japan, they
sa}r , that first exposed their weakness to the world, that robbed
them of Formosa dn deprived them of their ancient suzerainty over
Corea, which state she has now seized for herself, her action in
1
repelling the Russians was due to selfish motives." Furthermore,
China sees in Japan an agressor and menace. China recognizes the
imperialistic ambitions of her neighbor and truly knows that it is
natural for Japan to strive to become greater by securing a firm
footing on the continent of Asia before being able to accomplish her
ideal. If Japan vursues her present policy unmodified, the conflict
betv. een the oriental countries will be as sure as fate. In my con-
clusion, I may say that the peace or war of the future Far East will
depend more or loss upon the degree of Japan's ambition.
1. Coolidge: The Unisted States as a Yforld Power, p. 3S7.
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